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THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS'
By OSMOND K. FRAENKEL*
1 RESIDENT TEUMAN has recently appointed a commission to
study the possible expansion of the Federal Civil Rights law.
Why, one may ask, should a survey of this sort be necessary, more
than eighty years after the Emancipation Proclamation? The answer
is that the Negro still suffers in the United States from grave dis-
abilities, as do Mexicans and other "colored" people and, in lesser
respects, Jews, Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses and Communists.
The Negro remains the chief sufferer and his conditions are, of
course, at their worst in the South.
His disabilities cover a wide range.2 "Jim Crow" segregation
laws and practices still compel Negroes to travel separately from
whites and use different waiting rooms in stations, to go to different
(and usually inferior) schools and to live in crowded ghettos with
poor housing at exorbitant rents. Not all these practices have been
established by law Segregation in housing results almost entirely
from private agreements between land owners not to allow Negroes
.into certain areas. Most hotels and privately-owned places of
amusement exclude them, and not only in the South. They are
barred in many communities from public parks and benches. Until
recently, practically no provision for Negroes existed in Southern
law and medical schools. Whole areas of employment remain dosed,
often because labor unions bar Negroes from membership or admit
them.on an inferior basis only.
This pattern of differentiation (to avoid for the moment, the
*Associated with the firm of Hays, St. John, Abramson & Schulman,
New York City; author of Our Civil Liberties and numerous articles dealing
with that subject.1See Konvitz, The Constitution and Civil Rights (1947) for a more
extensive discussion of certain aspects of the problem.
2See Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).
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legally significant term "discrimination") carries over into the
political scene. Negroes have had a constant struggle to be per-
mitted to serve on juries and to vote. As rapidly as the Supreme
Court has struck down devices designed so to restrict, new de-
vices have sprung up. When it became clear that Negroes would
have to be allowed to vote in the general elections in the South,
they were denied the right to participate in the Democratic pri-
maries, the only election which mattered. As poll taxes proved less
of a barrier, due to increased prosperity and greater political con-
sciousness, educational requirements were so administered as to
keep Negroes from voting. And when all this fails, we see a Bilbo
openly calling on the white citizens to keep Negroes from the polls.
Whether or not, as Bilbo claims, he meant that this be done by
legal means only, makes no real difference. There should be no
legal means by which any group can be kept from voting.
Many other disabilities exist, aimed, of course, at the poor
and lowly of every description. But they, too, operate with especial
force to harass the Negro. It is common practice to round up a
lot of Negroes, charge them with vagrancy, fine them, and, with
complete legality, make them work out their fines on the highways.
In many states, a share-cropper can be forced to work out a debt
he owes his landlord. And debt is seldom absent. Moreover, ii
some states it is a crime to "entice labor," so that an outside
employer cannot come to localities where living standards are low
and offer opportunity to the oppressed. If he comes from another
state, he can solicit employees only after getting a license at an
exorbitant fee.3 Thus, unless he breaks away from the South
altogether, as hundreds of thousands have done in recent decades,
the Negro is still held to the soil.
There is little need to speak here of lynching and police brutality,
so well are these American specialties known. White supremacy
remains the official slogan of most Southern politicians. This is, of
course, an attitude fostered by bad economic conditions which have
led poor white groups to look on their Negro neighbors as the
enemy,4 instead of realizing that both could make common cause
against the ruling oligarchy
What can be done about all this? If the states are unwilling to
correct these abuses, and many of them are, can the federal gov-
ernment step in? How far has it tried to do so in the past? What
3See Williams v. Fears, (1900) 179 U. S. 270, 21 S. Ct. 128, 45 L. E"d.
186.
'See Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching (1933)
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have -the 'courts ruled, what changes may the future bring? Can
Uncle Sam himself see to it that Negroes get the same education
as whites and that they vote freely? Can Congress put an end to
segregation on trains and buses, and discrimination by hotels and
theatres, employers and labor unions? Can the federal government
outlaw agreements which keep Negroes from housing? Can the
federal courts punish state officials or private citizens who deprive
Negroes of their constitutional rights and sometimes even lynch
them?
Not all these questions can be definitely answered. We shall
consider the -way past attempts made by Congress to solve some
of these problems have been often emasculated by the courts,
speculating on the possibility that the Supreme Court may perhaps
come to repudiate some of its decisions. But we cannot ignore the
fact that political considerations may prevent Congress from exer-
cising its powers for good.
Before the Civil War the Federal Government had practically
no supervision over state interference with individual liberties.
The Constitution contained numerous restrictions on state action
in the commercial field, but it affected it in the realm of personal
freedom in only two respects. Article I, Section 10, prohibits a
state from passing ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. Article
IV, Section 2, provides that the citizens of one state shall be en-
titled to. all privileges and immunities enjoyed by those of the
others. Since the Supreme Court limited the character of the
privileges involved and ruled, further, that the Constitution afforded
no _protection against action taken by a person's own state,5 this
provision has had very little application.
When the Bill of Rights came up for adoption, the Senate
rejected an amendment which would have prevented states from
infringing on freedom of religion, speech and the press and from
denying jury trial in criminal cases. Partly on this account, partly
due to the history and wording of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme
Court uniformly held that its provisions did not affect the states.8
The Civil War amendments entirely altered this constitutional
situation, although in some respects the expectations of those who
5Bradwell v. Illinois, (1873) 16 Wall. 130, 21 L. Fd 442.
6Brown v. Mayor, etc. of Baltimore, (1833) 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672;
Livingston v. Moore, (1833) 7 Pet. 469, 8 L. Ed. 751 (trial by jury),
Permoli v. New Orleans, (1845) 3 How. 589, 11 L. Ed. 739 (religious
liberty), Fox v. Ohio, (1847) 5 How. 410, 12 L. Ed. 213 (double jeopardy),
Srflth v. Maryland, (1855) 18 How. 71, 15 L. Ed. 269 (searches and
seizures).
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fathered them have never been completely fulfilled. The three
amendments then adopted accomplished at least this much Slavery
was prohibited, equal protection of the laws was guaranteed and
the suffrage was insured against discrimination based on race,
color or previous condition of servitude. The first of the amend-
ments was binding not only on the states but on individuals, the
other two were made binding on the states only And Congress was
authorized to implement them by legislation.
From time to time, the Congress has passed laws seeking to
accomplish this objective. Some of them remain on the books, some
have been repealed, some have been declared unconstitutional.
They dealt with three main subjects denial of rights guaranteed
by the Constitution, discnmination by private persons and inter-
ference with the suffrage.
Actually, the first of the civil rights law was enacted before the
adoption of the 14th Amendment and after the ratification of the
13th.' In effect it foreshadowed the 14th, by guaranteeing to all,
in every state and territory, "the full and equal benefit of all laws,
* * * as is enjoyed by white citizens" and the equal right to make
contracts and hold property These provisions, re-enacted after the
adoption of the 14th Amendment,8 remain in force today 9 Their
constitutionality has been upheld as amplification of both the 13th
and the 14th Amendment. 10 Yet the importance of the provisions
is slight, since they add nothing to the language of the 14th
Amendment itself and prescribe no penalties.
In 1870, however, Congress passed the Enforcement Act."
This imposed criminal penalties for certain acts perpetrated against
citizens and, although most of its provisions were repealed either
in 189412 or 1909,13 several sections still remain. One of these1
punishes as a crime any conspiracy to deprive a citizen of rights
or privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
714 Stat. 27 (1866).
816 Stat. 144 (1870) U. S. C. Tit. 18, sec. 52, 18 U. S. C. A. 52, 7
F C. A. Tit. 18, sec. 52.
9U. S. C. Tit. 8, sec. 41, 42, 8 U. S. C. A. 41, 42, 2 F C. A. Tit. 8,
sec. 41, 42.loUnited States v. Cruikshank, (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588,
Ex parte Virginia, (1879) 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676, Gibson v. Missis-
sippi, (1896) 162 U. S. 565, 16 S. Ct. 904, 40 L. Ed. 1075.
1"16 Stat. 140 (1870) , U. S. C. Tit. 18, sec. 51, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 51,
7 F C. A. tit. 18, sec. 51.
1228 Stat. 36 (1894)
1335 Stat. 1153 (1909).
1
4U. S. C. tit. 18, sec. 51, 18 U. S. C. A. 51, 7 F C. A. tit. 18, see. S1
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States. It. protects citizens -only and applies only to conspiracies.
But it is.not-limited to action.by state officers.15 Another provision
still in force16 protects all persons and is not restricted to con-
spiracies, but it can be invoked only when the accused acted "under
color" of a state law or custom. Yet both these provisions touch
only rights guaranteed by federal power and judicial decisions
have greatly narrowed their scope.1 7 A third, also extant, 18 pro-
hibits interference with the right to vote because of race or color.
In 1871 Congress added to the Enforcement Act 9 provisions
wuch permitted civil actions for most of the things previously
made criminal. Some of these are still the law.2 The Civil Rights
Act of 187521 prohibited discrimination by innkeepers, carriers
and places of public amusement as well as in the selection of
jurors. The Supreme Court upheld the last provision2 2 and it
exists in the law today.23 But the Court2- declared the remaining
parts of the Act unconstitutional, since they were directed at
private persons and not at state action.
From these provisions a number of important legal questions
have emerged.
1. What are federally secured rights?
2. What difference in treatment amounts to inequality?
3. To what extent are private persons restricted?
4. What action is under color of state law?
1. FEDERAL RIGHTS
The question of what constitutes rights secured by the Federal
Constitution had received some judicial consideration before the
Civil War,-in connection with the privileges and immunities clause
of the original constitution. For, in an early circuit decision,- a
distinction was made between rights guaranteed by the state, such
"5See Umted States v. Ellis, (W.D.S.C. 1942) 43 F Supp. 321, 162
A. L. R. 1378.
16TU. S. C. tit. 18, sec. 52; 18 U. S. C. A. 52; 7 F C. A. tit. 18, sec. 52.
'-See cases cited notes 25-33 infra.
18U. S. C. tit. 8, sec. 31,8 U. S. C. A. 31, 2 F C. A. tit. 8, sec. 31.
2917 Stat 13 (1871).
2"0U. S. C. tit 8, sec. 43, 47, 48, 8 U. S. C. A. 43, 47, 48, 2 F C. A. tit.
8, sec. 43, 47,48, U. S. C. tit. 28, sec. 41 (12) (13) (14), 28 U. S. C. A. 41,
(12) (13) (14), 7 F C. A. tit 41 (12) (13) (14).
218 Stat. Part III 335 (1875).
-2Ex parte Virginia, (1879) 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676.
23U. S. C. tit 18, sec. 44, 45, 18 U. S. C. A. 44, 45, 7 F C. A. tit. 18,
sec. 44, 45.
24Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct 18, 27 L. Ed. 835.
-5Corfield v. Coryell, (1828) 4 Wash. C. C. 371, Fed. Cas. 3230.
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as the ordinary right to live at peace, and those guaranteed by the
federal power, such as that to petition the Federal Government for
redress of grievances.
The 14th Amendment added to the privileges and immunities
clause of the original Constitution a prohibition of any state action
which might abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States. The Civil Rights Acts also speak of privileges
and immunities secured by the United States Constitution or its
laws.
The meaning of these provisions under the 14th Amendment
was first considered in the Slaughter House cases.2 0 These cases,
involved, however, not civil liberties but business monopolies. The
majority of the Court declared it was not the purpose of the 14th
Amendment to bring within federal control the entire domain of
civil rights. It indicated, by way of example only, that the Consti-
tution did protect the right of access to the seat of government,
its offices and courts, and to the use of the navigable waters and
harbors of the country The four dissenting judges, (Field, Swayne,
Bradley and Chief Justice Chase) were of the opinion that the
privileges guaranteed include all "which by right belong to the
citizens of all free governments.1 27 At the same sitting, the Court
upheld a state's refusal to allow a married woman to practice
law,29 on the ground that this right was given by state, not federal
law
The basic rule then established has never been deviated from.
But considerable discussion has arisen as to what privileges were
federally secured. In the Critikshank case"' the Supreme Court
held an indictment bad because the rights interfered with were
given, not by the Federal, but by the state government. The indict-
ment charged a conspiracy interfering with the rights to assemble
peaceably, to bear arms, to be secure in life and liberty, to enjoy
the equal benefit of the laws and to vote. Chief Justice Waite
noted it had been charged neither that the assembly interfered
with was one to petition the Federal Government nor that the
wrongs charged to the defendants had been committed by them
due to the race or color of the persons they had interfered with.
Although some counts of the indictment did allege such racial
discrimination, these were considered objectionable in that they
26Slaughter House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. 36, 83 U. S. 36, 21 L. Ed.
394.
271d. 9728Bradwell v. Illinois, (1873) 16 Wall. 130, 21 L. Ed. 442.29United States v. Cruikshank, (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588.
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
lumped together rights constitutionally protected against dis-
crimnation (like the right to vote) and rights whuch were not,
(like that of assembly).
Another important decision made at that time30 held that the
right to jury trial in state cases was not federally secured. While
this case involved a civil trial, its doctrine was later applied in
criminal cases.31 Not even the expanded meaning recently given
the due process clause3 2 has resulted in federal protection against
state denial of trial by jury 3 8
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has upheld the power
of Congress to punish interference with the right of suffrage even
if not motivated by racial discrimination, when the voting has
been for federal offices only. Congress' power to deal with the sub-
ject derives from the provisions of the original Constitution,"'
which authorize it to "make or alter" regulations for holding a
Congressional election. The first case on the subject arose before
the 14th Amendment applied,35 but it was followed in later deci-
sions under the various civil rights laws we have discussed. 38 The
Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that the power of
Congress to regulate suffrage did not extend to state elections,
except where discrimination was involved.37
The exact scope of federal supervision over state officials who
may have acted wrongfully in connection with federal elections
for a long time remained uncertain on account of the repeal of
many provisions of the Enforcement Act which dealt particularly
with the suffrage.38 It was argued on the one hand that the statutes
whuch remained on the books authorized prosecution only for direct
interference with an individual's right to vote, on the other, that
soWalker v. Sauvmet, (1875) 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. Ed. 678.
Sljordan v. Massachusetts, (1912) 225 U. S. 167, 32 S. Ct. 651, 56
L. Ed. 1038.32See Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties (1944) 46-50; Wilkinson, The
Federal Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment (1938) 26 Geo. L. J. 439;
Fraenkel, One Hundred and Fifty Years of the Bill of Rights, (1939) 23
MINNEsoTA LAw R~vmIw 719; Note (1938) 7 Brooklyn I. Rev. 490.3sSee Palko v. Connecticut, (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149,
82 L. Ed. 288.34Art. I, Section 4.
35Ex parte Siebold, (1879) 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717
36EX parte Yarborough, (1884) 110 U. S. 651, 4 St. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed.
274, Gunn v. United States, (1915) 238 U. S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed.
1340, L. R. A. 1916A 1124, Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U. S. 368,
35 S. Ct. 932, 59 L. Ed. 1349; United States v. Classic, (1941) 313 U. S.
299; 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368, Smith v. Alvnght (1944) 321 U. S.
649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 98737james v. Bowman, (1903) 190 U. S. 127, 23 S. Ct 678, 47 L. Ed. 979.
3828 Stat. 36 (1894), 35 Stat. 1153 (1909).
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all interference with the voting process itself remained a federal
offense. In the Moseley case3" the Supreme Court, by a divided
vote, ruled that the remaining provisions of the law made it an
offense to disregard votes lawfully cast. In the Bathgate" case the
Court held, however, that bribery of voters was no longer a federal
offense. In the recent Saylor case41 a majority ruled that ballot
stuffing did remain such. The minority, (Justices Douglas, Black
and Reed), believed that the Moseley case should be confined to its
precise facts and that the 1894 repeal 42 was intended to restore
control over election offenses to the states. Yet, the majority deci-
sion makes it clear that any state election official can be federally
punished for denying an individual the right to vote or for failing
to give effect to his vote by not counting it or diluting its value
through improper counting.
For a long time there was uncertainty as to whether federal
jurisdiction extended at all to primary elections. This matter was
set at rest in United States v Classwc,4 3 at least in those states where
the primary election was authorized by express provision of law or
where it actually determined the result.
Other rights federally protected include those to enter public
lands,44 to be protected from violence while in custody of a federal
official, 45 to give information concerning federal offenses" and to
travel from state to state.4- The last subject has never been direct-
ly passed on by the Supreme Court. In the Wheeler case 48 an indict-
ment was held bad, both because the persons charged were private
individuals and because the threats involved had been made against
complainant in the state of his normal residence. The Court indi-
cated that while the right to travel from state to state was federally
protected, that to remain peaceably in one's own, was not. In the
39United States v. Moseley, (1915) 238 U. S. 383, 35 S. Ct. 904, 59 L.
Ed. 1355.
40United States v. Bathgate, (1918) 246 U. S. 220, 38 S. Ct. 269, 62
L. Ed. 676.4'United States v. Saylor, (1944) 322 U. S. 385, 64 S. Ct. 1101, 88
L. Ed. 1341.
4228 Stat. 36 (1894)
43United States v. Classic, (1941) 313 U. S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85
L. Ed. 1368.
44United States v Waddell, (1884) 112 U. S. 76, 5 S. Ct. 35, 28 L. Ed.
673.
45Logan v. United States, (1892) 144 U. S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed.
429.
"6Motes v. United States, (1900) 178 U. S. 458, 20 S. Ct. 493, 44 L. Ed.
1150.
4'Crandell v. Nevada, (1868) 6 Wall 35, 18 L. Ed. 745.
4United States v. Wheeler, (1920) 254 U. S. 281, 41 S. Ct. 133, 65
L. Ed. 270.
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recent Edwards case 9 a minority of the Court held a state law void
because it restricted the free movement of indigent persons, the
majority reaching the same result on the ground that the law con-
stituted an interference with interstate commerce.
The privileges and immunities clause became the basis of the
decision by a minority of the Court in Hague v. C.I.O 11 Justices
Roberts, Black and Chief Justice Hughes concluded that the right
to discuss the National Labor Relations Act was a privilege of
federal citizenship. Justice Stone, however, said explicitly9 ' that
freedom of speech and of assembly did not fall within the protection
of the privileges and immunities clause. He believed the record in
the case did not show that discussion of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act was involved. He pointed out,52 however, that the Civil
Rights Act permitted the suit because it challenged the validity of
Jersey City ordinances on due process grounds. Both majority
groups were of the opinon that in cases of tlus kind it is not
necessary for a plaintiff to show that his damages exceed the
$3,000 generally required to permit suit in a federal court.
The rule of the Hague case was expanded in Douglas v.
Jeannette.5 s This was a suit by members of Jehovah's Witnesses
to restrain enforcement of a muicipal ordinance requiring pay-
ment of a license tax for the privilege of distributing leaflets on
the public streets, when accompanied by solicitation of funds. The
Supreme Court held that the suit had been properly brought under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871,14 on the ground that the right to free
speech was secured against state action by the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment. Chief Justice Stone said :55
"Allegations of fact sufficient to show deprivation of the right
to free speech under the First Amendment are sufficient to establish
deprivation of a constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth,
and to state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, when-
ever it appears that the abridgment of the right is effected under
color of a state statute or ordinance."
Thus it is dear that, whatever may be the limitations of the
49Edwards v. California, (1941) 314 U. S. 160, 62 S. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed.
119.
50Hague v. C. I. 0., (1939) 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423.
51Id. 519.52 d. 525.
5sDouglas v. City of Jeannette, (1943) 319 U. S. 157, 63 S. Ct. 877, 87
L. Ed. 1324.
54U. S. C. tit. 8, sec. 43, 8 U. S. C. A. 43, 2 F C. A. tit. 8, sec. 43,
U. S. C. tit. 28, sec. 41 (12), 28 U. S. C. A. 41 (12), 7 F C. A. tit. 28,
sec. 41 (12).
55Douglas v. City of Jeannette, (1943) 319 U. S. 157, 162; 63 S. Ct.
877, 87 L. Ed. 1324.
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privileges and immunities clause alone, the Civil Rights laws, as
now interpreted, permit an attack on any state regulation which
interferes with one of the basic freedoms specified in the Bill of
Rights, since these have been siphoned into the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment.5"
Yet neither the right to vote nor the right to be a candidate
for state office is federally secured. This is why attempts to outlaw
state poll tax laws have failed.5 7 And in Snowden v Hughes"0 the
Supreme Court refused to entertain a complaint that state offi-
cials had refused to certify the correct results of a primary elec-
tion. Even Justices Douglas and Murphy dissented only on the
narrow ground that the record in the case showed discrimination.
In Screws v United States"0 however, the majority of the
Court rejected the contention of defense counsel that the Civil
Rights Law was too vague for enforcement because it did riot
specify the rights which were federally guaranteed. These, said
Mr Justice Douglas, had become defined by successive decisions
of the Court. It had been settled that for a state officer to maltreat
a person after his arrest was a denial of due process. 0 Therefore,
any state officer who committed such an act in the knowledge it
was wrong, could be punished. But it was necessary to establish
that the violation of right had been wilful. The majority, therefore,
reversed the conviction, since they believed the jury had been
insufficiently instructed. This decision became possible under un-
usual circumstances. Three of the justices (Roberts, Frankfurter
and Jackson) thought that the indictment should have been dis-
missed altogether, both because the statute was too vague and
because the acts complained of had not been committed under color
of state law Justices Rutledge and Murphy thought that the con-
viction snould have been affirmed, but Justice Rutledge concurred
with the decision of the four justices who thought there should
be a new trial only because, otherwise, the case would remain un-
disposed of. Both these justices maintained there could be no
doubt the state officials knew they had no right to do what they
did. Mr. Justice Murphy pointed out that the question of the
sufficiency of the judge's charge had not been raised in the lower
56See note 32 supra.
57Breedlove v. Suttles, (1937) 302 U. S. 277, 58 S. Ct. 205, 82 L. Ed. 252.58Snowden v. Hughes, (1944) 321 U. S. 1. 64 S. Ct. 397, 88 L. Ed. 497
59Screws v. United States, (1945) 325 U. S. 91, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L.
Ed. 1495.
OOAs had been held in Culp v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th 1942) 131 Fed.
(2d) 93, Catlette v. United States, (C.C.A. 4th 1943) 132 F (2d) 902.
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courts and that there was no need for any explicit charge on the
subject of wilfulness. He said
"It is an illusion to say that the real issue in this case is the
alleged failure of §20 fully to warn the state officials that their
actions were illegal. The Constitution, §20 and their own con-
sciences told them that. They knew that they lacked any mandate
or authority to take human life unnecessarily or without due process
of law in the course of their duties. They knew that their excessive
and abusive use of authority would only subvert the ends of justice.
The significant question, rather, is whether law enforcement offi-
cers and those entrusted with authority shall be allowed to violate
with impunity the clear constitutional rights of the inarticulate
and the friendless. Too often unpopular minorities, such as Negroes,
are unable to find effective refuge from the cruelties of bigoted
and ruthless authority. States are undoubtedly capable of punish-
ing their officers who commit such outrages. But where, as here,
the states are unwilling for some reason to prosecute such crimes
the federal government must step in unless constitutional guaran-
tees are to become atrophied."
The effect of the majority decision has been unfortunate, be-
cause the stress on the necessity for wilful violation of constitu-
tional rights makes it easy for a judge unsympathetic to the prose-
cution to induce a jury to acquit. This is what actually happened
on the retrial of the Screws case.
The lower federal courts have had recent occasion to consider
various problems in this field. For an example, an indictment which
alleged conspiracy on the part of private persons to interfere with
free speech was held bad, since no state action was involved and
no federal right affected.6 - It was also held that no basis existed
for a suit claiming conspiracy to prevent employment in the
W.P.A., because plaintiff had no "absolute right" to such em-
ployment.63 On the other hand, a Circuit Court of Appeals sus-
tained a complaint which sought damages for unlawful arrest,
on the ground that an arrest had been made under color of the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.04 Also, jurisdiction has been
accepted to enjoin enforcement of a state labor law,6 5 as well as to
entertain suits against discrimination in the payment of school
salaries.66 And a suit for damages was held proper, based on the
61325 U. S. at 137
62Powe v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th 1940) 109 F (2d) 147, cert. denied
(1940) 309 U. S. 679.63Love v. Chandler, (C.C.A. 8th 1942) 124 F (2d) 785.64Pickng v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (C.C.A. 3d 1945) 151 F (2d)
240, 152 id. 753.65Stapleton v. Mitchell, (D. Kans. 1945) 60 F Supp. 51, app. dis. by
stip. (1945) 326 U. S. 690.66Alston v. School Board, (C.C.A. 4th 1940) 112 F (2d) 992; Thomp-
son v. Gibbes, (E.D.S.C. 1945) 60 F Supp. 872.
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denial to a Negro of the right to train as librarian in a school
maintained by a municipality 67
2. DIFFERENCES IN TREATMENT
The civil rights law, of course, includes claims based on the
equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Most of the ques-
tions arising under that clause have, however, been decided in
prosecutions under the challenged state laws, rather than in actions
for damages under the civil rights laws. They will be briefly re-
viewed here because of their importance as background to the
subject.
While the 14th Amendment guarantees equal protection of the
laws, it does not require that all people be treated alike. Thus
segregation is not necessarily prohibited. In 1896, the Supreme
Court"5 upheld a state law which compelled separate railroad ac-
commodations for Negroes and whites, pointing out that, if there
was any feeling of exclusion as the result of the law, this came
from the consciousness of the Negro, not from the law itself. Mr
Justice Harlan wrote an eloquent dissent which has not been heeded.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court voided a state law which
permitted a railroad to provide dining and sleeping accommoda-
tions for white persons only, on the ground that this constituted
a clear denial of equality 61
The question in these cases remains always, therefore, whether
or not the facilities awarded, although separate, are equal. The
principle was recently applied to a public housing project where a
lower federal court refused to interfere with proposed segrega-
tion.7 0 It has been applied also to laws compelling separate schools.71
There the assumption of equal accommodations is wholly unrealis-
tic, because the authorities have not devoted to the Negro schools
the same amount of money as to schools for white children. This
has been true particularly with regard to teacher's salaries, at-
tempts to correct the scale of which have caused recent litigation.72
6TKerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, (C.C.A. 4th 1945) 149 F (2d)
212, cert. denied (1945) 326 U. S. 721.68Plessy v. Ferguson, (1896) 163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed.
256.
69McCabe v. Atchison T. & S. F Ry., (1914) 235 U. S. 151. 35 S. Ct.
69, 59 L. Ed. 169.
7OFavors v. Randall, (E.D. Pa. 1941) 40 F Supp. 743.
71Gong Lum v. Rice, (1927) 275 U. S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172.
72Alston v. School Board, (C.C.A. 4th 1940) 112 F (2d) 992, Thomp-
son v. Gibbes, (E.D.S.C. 1945) 60 F Supp. 872.
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In a case coming from Missouri the Supreme Court"3 put a
stop to a curious form of discrimnation. A Negro had been denied
adnussion to the law school maintained by the State University
Missouri offered to pay the cost of his tuition in a law school in a
neighboring state. The majority of the Supreme Court held tis
to constitute an improper condition and ruled that Missouri must
either set up a law school for Negroes or let them enter the school
already in existence.
On the other hand, laws prohibiting inter-marrage between
different races have been upheld, on the ground that they bear
equally on both races.7 4
A more consistent recognition of the command to equality has
existed m the field of jury service. When Southern states passed
laws expressly excluding Negroes, the Supreme Court declared
them to be unconstitutional. 5 The state authorities then simply
did not put Negroes on the jury lists. Although the convictions of
some Negroes were reversed soon after that practice started,78 it
remained difficult to establish discrimination until the technique
for doing so was developed at the second Scottsboro trial, in 1933.
In that case, counsel for the accused actually brought qualified
Negroes to court and convinced the United States Supreme Court"
that the denial of intended discrimination by the jury commis-
sioners was worthless in the face of their long failure to place
Negroes on the lists. And the Court has since made it clear that
mere lip service to the Constitution is not enough and that con-
victions will not be sustained where Negroes have been placed on
lists under such circumstances that they will practically never be
called for service.73 Recently the Supreme Court has given con-
sideration to the whole problem of the basis for the selection of
jurors.79 Since, however, these cases affect the federal judicial
system, they need no further discussion here.
73Missoun ex rel. Games v. Canada, (1938) 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct.
232, 83 L. Ed. 208.
74Pace v. Alabama, (1883) 106 U. S. 583, 1 S. Ct. 637, 27 L. Ed. 207,
Stevens v. United States, (C.C.C. 10th 1944) 146 F (2d) 120.
75Strauder v. West Virginia, (1880) 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664,
Neal v. Delaware, (1881) 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567
78Carter v. Texas, (1900) 177 U. S. 442, 20 S. Ct. 687, 44 L. Ed. 839;
Rogers v. Alabama, (1904) 192 U. S. 226, 24 S. Ct 257, 48 L. Ed. 417, but
see Smith v. Mississippi, (1896) 162 U. S. 529, 16 S. Ct. 879, 40 L. Ed.
1062; Martin v. Texas, (1906) 200 U. S. 316, 26 S. Ct 338, 50 L. Ed. 497
'
7 Nor~is v. Alabama, (1935) 294 U. S. 587, 55 S. Ct 579, 79 L. Ed.
1074.
7sSmith v. Texas, (1940) 311 U. S. 128, 61 S. Ct 164, 85 L. Ed. 84.
*9Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., (1946) 328 U. S. 217, 66 S. Ct. 984,
Ballard v. United States, (1946) 67 S. Ct 261.
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Discrimination may result from administrative action in fields
other than that of jury service also. The leading case is that of
Yick Wo. 80 A conviction under a San Francisco laundry licensing
ordinance was reversed, on the ground that it had been used in
such a way as to discriminate against Chinese laundrymen.
While the equal protection clause constitutes the chief source
of protection against discrimination, Congress can also deal with
the subject as the result of some of the powers granted it under the
original Constitution. Thus, under the interstate commerce clause,
Congress can regulate practices of interstate carriers. It has ac-
tually forbidden discrimination by such carriers,81 but has not yet
gone so far as to prohibit segregation."
3. PRIVATE PERSONS
As we have noted, the 13th Amendment prohibits slavery and
is not, in its application, restricted to state action alone. Therefore
it directly affects individuals. And Congress has accordingly passed
laws aimed at the continuation of slavery 13 These have generally
been sustained by the Supreme Court.8 4 The Court has also struck
down various state laws seeking in one way or another to legalize
peonage.85
Further, although the 14th Amendment by its terms protects
against state action only, Congress has provided for the punish-
ment of individuals, whether or not state officers, who act in
concert either with each other"8 or with state officers, under color
of state law 87 Yet, as we have seen these provisions are surely
8OYick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed.
220.
81U. S. C. tit. 49, sec. 31 (1), 49 U. S. C. A. 31 (1), 10 A. F C. A.
tit. 49, sec. 31 (1). See Mitchell v. United States, (1941) 313 U. S. 80, 61
S. Ct. 873, 85 L. Ed. 1201.
r2The decision in Morgan v. Virginia, (1946) 328 U. S. 373, 66 S. Ct.
1050, was only to the effect that no state could compel segregation in inter-
state traffic because this would destroy the uniformity required by the com-
merce clause. It is possible that segregation under regulations voluntarily
established by a carrier cannot be upset until Congress amends the law.
83U. S. C. tit. 8, sec. 56, 8 U. S. C. A. 56, 8 F C. A. tit. 8, sec. 56,
U. S. C. tit. 18, sec. 421, 18 U. S. C. A. 421, 7 F C. A. tit. 18, sec. 421.84Umted States v. Reynolds, (1914) 235 U. S. 133, 35 S. Ct. 86, 59
L. Ed. 162, Pierce v. United States (C.C.A. 5th 1944) 146 F (2d) 84, cert.
denied (1945) 324 U. S. 873.85Taylor v. Georgia, (1942) 315 U. S. 25, 62 S. Ct. 415, 86 L. Ed. 615,
Pollock v. Williams, (1944) 322 U. S. 4, 64 S. Ct. 792, 88 L. Ed. 1095.
8616 Stat. 140 (1870), U. S. C. tit. 18, sec. 51, 18 U. S. C. A. 51, 7
F C. A. tit. 18, sec. 51.
8716 Stat. 144 (1870), U. S. C. tit. 18, sec. 52, 18 U. S. C. A. 52, 7
F C. A. tit. 18, sec. 52. See Picking v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., (C.C.A. 3d
1945) 151 F (2d) 240.
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
constitutional only insofar as they affect rights guaranteed by the
federal government other than those specified in the 14th or 15th
Amendments, the latter being limited to state action.
This basic rule was announced m the Civil Rights cases," short-
ly after the enactment of the last in the series of Civil Rights
laws. 9 That law had declared all persons in the United States
entitled to the equal enjoyment of all facilities offered by inns, com-
mon carriers and places of public amusement. It gave the person
discriminated against the right to sue for a penalty and also made
the offense a crime. Five test cases came to the Supreme Court,
four arising out of criminal prosecutions and one out of an action
for damages. They involved theatres, hotels and railroad service.
The majority of the Court, by Mr. Justice Bradley, held that
the 14th Amendment compelled only governmental action and that
the discrimination the various private persons had practiced did
not come within that category Mr. Justice Harlan, in solitary
dissent, believed that the law could be sustained under either the
13th or 14th Amendments. He thought that Congress could now
inplement the prohibition against slavery by making freedom
mean something, just as it had, before the Civil War, implemented
slavery by enacting the Fugitive Slave laws. 0 He also expounded
the view that the privileges and immunities clause of the original
Constitution covered the freed slaves and was not limited to state
action as such. Justice Harlan also supported the law under the
14th Amendment on the theory that the businesses reached by the
Civil Rights Act were in effect state agencies, since charged with
duties to the public.and amenable to governmental regulation. He
said:"-
"The one underlying purpose of congressional legislation has
been to enable the-black race to take the rank of mere citizens. The
difficulty has been to compel a recognition of the legal right of the
black race to take the rank of citizens, and to secure the enjoyment
of privileges-belonging, under the law, to them as a component
part of the people for whose welfare and happiness government is
ordained. At every step, in this direction, the nation has been
confronted with class tyranny, which a contemporary English
historian says is, of all tyrannies, the most intolerable, 'for it is
ubiquitous in its operation, and weighs, perhaps, most heavily on
those whose obscurity or distance would withdraw them from
the notice of a single despot.' Today, it is the colored race which
8sCivil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835.
8918 Stat. (Part III) 335 (1875).
9oCiting Prigg v. Pennsylvama, (1842) 16 Pet. 539, 10 L. Ed. 1060.91Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U. S. 3, 61, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835.
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is denied, by corporations and individuals wielding public authority,
rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship. At some
future time, it may be that some other race will fall under the ban
of race discrimination. If the constitutional amendments be en-
forced, according to the intent with which, as I conceive, they were
adopted, there cannot be, in this republic, any class of human
beings in practical subjection to another class, with power in the
latter to dole out to the former just such privileges as they may
choose to grant."
This dissent has produced no following. The Supreme Court
has consistently adhered to the view of the majority 92 The only
indication of a possible deviation is to be found in the recent
Texas White Primary case, Smith v. Allh.rsght.
93
Whether or not the exclusion of Negroes from participation in
primary elections in the Southern States (where such elections
actually dominate the final choice) violated the 14th Amendment
has been under consideration by the Supreme Court over a period
of years. At first, Texas disqualified Negroes from participation in
the primaries, by express provision of law After the Supreme
Court unanimously condemned this law in Nixon v Herndon, 4
Texas amended its election laws and gave to the state executive
committee of the Democratic party the right to prescribe qualifi-
cations for voting in the primaries. When the new law came before
the Supreme Court, it adhered to its earlier view (but this time
by a five to four decision) on the ground that the resulting discrinii-
nation was still caused by state action.95 Thereafter the state con-
vention of the party itself made the decision to disqualify This,
said a unanimous Court, in Grovey v. Towvnsad,0 no longer
constituted state action. It seemed, therefore, that the Democratic
party had found a way of effectively disfranchising the Negro in
the South.
Some years after the decision in the Grovey case, the Supreme
Court decided, in the Classic case, 97 that Congress had power to
regulate the primary where it was an integral part of the election
machinery or where it actually determined the final result. The
.Hodges v. United States, (1906) 203 U. S. 1, 27 S. Ct. 6, 51 L. Ed.
65 Butts v. Merchants Co., (1913) 230 U S. 126, 33 S. Ct. 964, 57 L. Ed.
1422 Wheeler v. United States. (1920) 254 U. S. 281, 41 S. Ct. 133, 65 L.
Ed. 270.
-Smith v. kilwright. (1944) 321 U S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987
5Nixon v. Herndon, (1927) 273 U. S. 536, 47 S. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759.
9r'Nixon v. Condon, (1932) 286 U S. 73, 52 S. Ct. 484, 76 L. Ed. 984.
9(Grovey v. Townsend, (1935) 295 U. S. 45, 55 S. Ct. 622, 79 L. Ed.
1292.
97United States v Classic, (1941) 313 U S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85
L. Ed. 1368
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Smith case was then brought from Texas to the Supreme Court,
with the result that the Supreme Court overruled the Grovey case,
on the ground that in Texas the primary was part of the approved
election machinery established by the State. Only Mr. Justice
Roberts dissented. In that case, however, the Supreme Court did
not refer to the second basis for federal concern with primaries
which had been referred to m the Classic case. the controlling
influence of the primary in the final election. Whether the Court
intended by its silence to overrule the Classic case to that extent
may soon be evident, since South Carolina and Georgia have re-
pealed all their laws regarding primary elections. In consequence,
Negroes will in these states be prevented from voting in the pri-
maries. Since the primary controls the result in these, as in most
of the Southern states, the Supreme Court may use this fact as a
basis for upholding Negroes' rights. It can be argued, moreover,
that the repealing laws were themselves unconstitutional, since
directly aimed at producing discrimination against Negroes and,
therefore, constituting discrimination by the states as dearly as if
the laws directly barred Negroes from the primaries.
There is another aspect to these primary cases. Whether or not
a primary election controls the result or is regulated by the state,
it should be within the power of Congress to prohibit any inter-
ference with voting, when only federal offices are involved. Cer-
tainly Congress could punish a private person who, by force, pre-
vents a citizen from voting in a primary held for the selection of
a member of Congress. The argument that the primary was the
private act of a political party should make no difference here. And
the result should be the same when the demal of the vote is not
by force, but by a disqualification based on race. It may be that the
existing civil rights law are not adequate to reach all aspects of
primary elections. Perhaps specific legislation by Congress is
necessary more- fully to extend federal control over primary elec-
tions. And, while the Supreme Court has given no hint that it
would approve such legislation, the statement of Mr. Justice Reed
in the Snath case may lead the way 8
"The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic
law grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of
elected officials without restriction by any State because of race.
This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be
nullified by a State through casting its electoral process in a form
which perrmits a private organization to practice racial discrimina-
9s8Smith v. Allwright. (1944) 321 U. S. 649, 664, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88
L. Ed. 987
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tion in the election. Constitutional rights would be of little value
if they could be thus indirectly denied."
Despite rulings in particular cases to the effect that the agency
whose action is complained of was an agency of the state, the rule
remains firmly established that Congress has no power to pro-
hibit discrimination by private persons, except as an incident to
one of the powers granted by the original constitution, such as the
power to regulate interstate commerce,"' or the power of taxation
or the appropriation of funds.
In one field, nevertheless, the power of Congress to deal with
offenses committed entirely by private persons may be upheld by
the Supreme Court. That is when persons accused of crime are
deprived by a lynching of their opportunity for a trial. It has been
urged that lynchings in which no state officials take part are punish-
able only under state law, because no wrong has been done under
color of state authority 100 As against this, there is the argument
that, since lynchings are possible only when the state has failed in
its duty of protection, these have resulted from state action within
the intendment of the 14th Amendment.10 1 It can be further urged
that, since it is of the essence of due process that a person accused
of a crime be given a judicial trial, a denial of this opportunity
through lynching constitutes the deprivation of a right secured by
the federal Constitution. Indictments based on that theory have
been upheld in districts courts, but until now the question has not
been passed upon in the higher courts since no convictions have
been obtained.1 02 This argument would not apply to a lynching
which took place before the suspect had been formally charged
with crime, nor would it perhaps apply to a lynching after a suspect
had been released on bail. However, the Department of Justice
has deemed this latter situation to be sufficiently within its juris-
diction to have investigated the circumstances of the lynching in
Monroe, Georgia, unfortunately, without any practical results.
99Butts v. Merchants Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 126, 33 S. Ct. 964, 57 L. Ed.
1422.
l°°Umted States v. Harris, (1883) 106 U. S. 629, 1 S. Ct. 601, 27
L. Ed. 290, is generally cited in support of this view. This, however, is not
decisive, since the prosecution involved only the equal protection and not
the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.
'
0t See Hale, Force and the State (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 149, 185,
Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private Rights (1938) 47 Yale L.
T. 1051, 1072, cf. Catlette v. United States, (C.C.A. 4th 1943) 132 F (2d)
902, 907
102Ex parte Riggins, (N.D. Ala. 1904) 134 Fed. 404. See also un-
reported instances mentioned by Konvitz, The Constitution and Civil Rights
(1947) 88,89.
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There are two other fields in which attempts have been made
to induce the Courts to depart from the general rule that private
action is not subject to the restrictions of the 14th -Amendment. As
we have noted, there are many localities in which Negroes are
denied the right to live on account of restrictive covenants entered
into between land owners. In Corrigan v. Buckley 0 3 the Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal brought to review a District of Columbia
decision enforcing such a covenant. Mr. Justice Sanford stated that
neither the 13th nor the 14th Amendment had any application to
contracts of this character and that it could not be said the action
of the' courts themselves violated the amendments."' This case
has"0 5 been interpreted as holding only that the equal protection
clause has no application to the District of Columbia. Whether this
is true or not may soon be decided, since the question has recently
been litigated in a number of states.
Discrimination by labor unions has also resulted in a con-
siderable amount of recent litigation. The United States Supreme
Court has given Negroes limited protection, although not on
constitutional grounds, in holding that a union which has been
certified as the collective bargaining agent under the Railway Labor
Act, is bound to protect equally all workers for whom it bargains. 10
Those cases did not have to do with admission to membership, but
only with a discriminatory use of bargaining power.
However, in Betts v. Easley,' 7 the Kansas Supreme Court
held that a union bargaining under the Railway Labor Act was,
in effect, a governmental agency and, therefore, bound to refrain
from discrimination in membership. Other cases have held that
1o3Corrigan v. Bucldey, (1926) 271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed.
969; cf. Mays v. Burgess, (C.A.D.C. 1945) 147 F (2d) 869; cert. dented
(1945) 325 U. S. 868.
104Judical action can, of course, violate the 14th Amendment, as when
a judge conducts an unfair trial, or arbitrarily discriminates on the ground
of race. Judicial action has also been held to be a violation of due process
when it interferes with freedom of speech. See Bridges v. California, (1941)
314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192; Swing v. A. F L., (1941) 312
U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855. It has been argued that the enforce-
ment of a restrictive covenant constitutes judicial dental of equal protection.
McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation. by State Court Enforcement of
Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitu-
tional. (1945) 33 California Law Review 5.
'"5See Sipes v. McGhee, Mich. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 1947
'o6Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., (1944) 323 U. S. 192, 65
S. Ct 225, 89 L. Ed. 173, Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Engineers, (1944) 323 U. S. 210, 65 S. Ct. 235, 89 L. Ed. 187 Cf.
Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, (1944) 323 U. S. 248, 65 S. Ct. 238, 89
L. Ed. 216.
107(1946) 161 Kan. 459.
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unions with closed shop contracts could not at the same time en-
force the contracts and exclude Negroes.'"8 Until now, however, no
court has protected Negroes against discrimination by unions
certified under a State Labor Law, on the ground that such unions
have thereby become state agencies.
Some possible basis for the extension of constitutional pro-
tection into these fields may be derived from the recent decision in
Marsh v. Alabama.10 9 Members of Jehovah's Witnesses were
ordered off the streets of a company-owned town. This was held
to be a denial of freedom of speech. Mr. Justice Black pointed out
that the company was performing a public function. Of course, it
must be borne in mind that the case came to the Court as a result
of a conviction under a state law, so that what was directly in
issue was state action.
There are possibilities, therefore, that the rights guaranteed
by the 14th Amendment may be extended over areas previously
considered wholly private, even if the Supreme Court adheres to
its original basic position.
4. "CoLoR OF STATE LAW"
One of the provisions of the Enforcement Act which still is
law punishes any deprivation of federally secured rights, if per-
petrated under color of a state law or a custom. 1"0 The Federal
Judicial Code permits suits to be brought for the vindication of such
wrongs as these, regardless of the amount in controversy "I No
difficulty has arisen in applying the provisions, where an attack
has been made directly on the validity of some state or municipal
law under which state officers have acted. Stich attacks were the
basis for federal jurisdiction in several of the cases already dis-
cussed.
The difficulty in applying the law has arisen where state offi-
cials acted in violation of state law, rather than in obedience to its
commands. The Supreme Court recently considered the problem
in the Classic case. 1' There state election commissioners were
charged with having falsely counted ballots cast in a primary elec-
lOSMarsh v. Alabama, (1946) 326 U. S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276.
'O9James v. Marinship Corp., (1944) 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P (2d) 329.
1IOU. S. C. tit. 18, sec. 52, 18 U. S. C. A. 52, 7 F C. A. tit. 18, sec 52.
11U. S. C. tit. 28, sec. 41 (14), 28 U. S. C. A. 41 (14), 7 F C. A.
tit. 28, sec. 41 (14). See Hague v. C. 1. 0., (1939) 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct.
954, 83 L. Ed. 1423.
"'United States v. Classic, (1941) 313 U. S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85
L. Ed. 1368.
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tion. Obviously, the state law did not contemplate that ballots
should be improperly counted. Mr. Justice Stone said"13
"Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."
The matter was more fully reviewed in the Screws case.'
The majority of the Court rejected the argument that, since the
acts complained of were criminal under state law, they could not
have been under color of that law. Mr. Justice Douglas said:""
"It is clear that under 'color' of law means under 'pretense' of
law Thus acts of officers m the ambit of their personal pursuits
are plainly excluded. Acts of officers who undertake to perform
their official duties are included whether they hew to the line of
their authority or overstep it."
From this decision Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson
dissented on the ground that the legislation was intended to pre-
vent defiance of the Constitution and was not, therefore, applicable
where the state obeyed the Constitution, although its officers had
flouted the law 1 6 The minority considered the view expressed
in the Classwc case as unnecessary to that decision and that it
should be overruled.
5. PROPOSED CHANGES
There is one hing which the federal government can do to
alleviate the conditions described in the introduction to the present
article without raising any question of constitutional power. To
be sure, this would affect only a very limited area, the District of
Columbia. For Congress has the same great and plenary power in
the District of Columbia that the various state legislatures possess
over their own territories. Without fear of judicial nullification it
could enact a comprehensive civil rights law abolishing all rem-
nants of Jim Crowism, prohibiting discrimination in employment,
and outlawing restrictive covenants, and could so show the coun-
try and the world that racism must vamsh in the nation's capital.
Until Congress is willing to do at least this much, speculation re-
garding the extent to which it can extend control in these matters
over the states remains largely academic.
A few changes can be made in existing law, without encounter-
"13Id. 326.





ing constitutional objection. One, is the simple enactment that
all interferences with federally secured rights are criminal, and
not as now, that only those resulting from conspiracy or under
color of state law are. This change would not, of course, be very far
reaching. But there is no reason for not making it. Congress could
also strengthen the present laws dealing with the suffrage, par-
ticularly by making it an offense to interfere in any way with
presidential elections, to overcome a lower court ruling11 that
existing laws do not cover these. Specific legislation may also be
desirable in order to broaden the base for dealing with primary
elections, a base now somewhat limited by the Supreme Court, in
the Classic case.118
Congress might further use the commerce power both by pro-
hibiting segregation by inter-state carriers and by prohibiting dis-
crimination by labor unions or employers engaged in inter-state
commerce. Finally, Congress could make clear that none of its
agencies may either practice or tolerate discrimination or segrega-
tion. This would put an end to the actual encouragement of re-
strictive covenants now given by some government-lending insti-
tutions. It might also use its power of appropriation by condition-
ing aid to local areas, for such needs as education and highways,
on abolition of racial discrimination and segregation. The diffi-
culty is that aid so conditioned might be refused, leaving the people
worse off than before. No such objection can be advanced, how-
ever, against a similar use of the taxing power There is no reason
why educational or charitable institutions which discrimiiiate or
segregate should have the privilege of tax exemption.
Beyond these simple things there seems no scope for change
which does not raise constitutional questions. So we should con-
sider whether the Supreme Court can be induced to overrule the
most restrictive of its holdings that the privileges and iinmumties
protected by the 14th Amendment are limited in scope, that segre-
gation is not denial of equal protection, and that Congress has no
power to prevent even discrimination by private persons, except
in the limited field of inter-state commerce.
There is, in my opinion, no likelihood that the Supreme Court
will withdraw from the interpretation it has consistently placed
upon the privileges and immunities clause. But such withdrawal
117Walker v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1937) 93 F (2d) 383, 388,
cert. denied on appeal of defendants, (1938) 303 U. S. 655.
"$United States v. Classic, (1941) 313 U. S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85
L. Ed. 1368.
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is no longer as important as it once was. For, by holding that most
of the basic privileges are protected against state action by the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court
has, in effect, accomplished the same result as though it had given
a broad meaning to the privileges and immunities clause itself.
Nor can it be expected of the Supreme Court that it will
abandon the ruling that the 14th Amendment does not reach private
persons.11 9 For it is undemable that the equal protection clause,
by its express terms, is a limitation on the states alone. And it
can hardly be stretched to cover every kind of private discrimina-
tion. On the other hand, Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil
Rights cases2 has great force. This can best be summed up by
the statement that discrimination in the use of facilities available
to the general public is both a badge of slavery which the 13th
Amendment was designed to eliminate and a use of state power
because of state control over such facilities. That argument be-
comes particularly persuasive when the facilities involved are those
of state created monopolies, such as means of transportation. And
there is recent judicial authority to support this view with respect
to labor unions exercising functions created by law and the attempt
by a company town to keep propagandists off its streets.12 1 A new
attempt by Congress to outlaw discrimination in all such quasi pub-
lic enterprises might well be sustained by the present Supreme
Court.
As to segregation, we have learned much of its motivation and
consequences in the half century since the Supreme Court de-
cided that, if the Negro feels aggrieved, lus consciousness and
not the law, is at fault. We have come to understand that inferiority
complexes are no better for society than for the individual. It seems
reasonable, therefore, that the Court can be shown the lack of
realism in its former view, provided all the facts of segregation
be properly presented to it. Such a presentation will require a
Brandeis-like brief, one which would draw on history and sociology
on a world scale. Against a background so fully presented, certainly
it must at least become clear that no equality exists under the law,
when one group of citizens is treated differently on account of its
color. The pretense that there can be separate, but equal, facilities
is a hollow sham. It is time the Supreme Court struck it down.
"9Despite the argument which has been advanced that the framers of
the 14th Amendment intended private persons to be subject to its restraints:
Flack, The Adoption of the 14th Amendment (1906). Boudin, Truth and
Fiction about the 14th Amendment (1938), 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 19.
120Civl Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835.
121See cases cited in notes 106, 107, and 108 supra.
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Should these prognostications prove sound, then the area for
Congressional action would, of course, be immensely extended.
There might be real hope that the disabilities suffered by the Negro
were en route to extinction, Congress would be able to outlaw
all forms of Jim Crowism in railroads, buses and other forms of
transportation, perhaps also in theatres, hotels and any public
places licensed by the state, segregation by state law would conie
to an end, and Negroes would not be relegated to separate schools,
colleges, parks and playgrounds.
These possible reversals by the Supreme Court would not, of
course, touch the power of Congress to deal with lynching by
private individuals. We have already discussed the legal prob-
lems here involved. Whatever their ultimate solution by the Supreme
Court, Congress might well remove any doubts regarding the
applicability of existing law by passing one of the many bills on
the subject which have, from time to time, been proposed.
Nor would Supreme Court reversal affect the suffrage. In this
field Congress can perhaps do little, directly Three devices are at
present used to restrict the vote and particularly, to exclude
Negroes the white primary, the poll tax and educational require-
ments. The Supreme Court has struck down the first of these in its
most universal form and will probably deal the same way with re-
cent attempts to overcome that ruling. The poll tax is so old, it
has never been successfully attacked in the courts.1 22 Hills to
outlaw it have been blocked by filibusters in the Senate Their
constitutionality has been questioned on the ground that the qualifi-
cations of voters are left entirely to the states, " 3 except as these
have been restricted by the 15th and 19th Amendments which pro-
hibit discrimination on grounds of race or sex. On the other hand,
it has been urged that Congress can outlaw the poll tax because of
its control over the manner of holding elections for lederal offices.
The argument is that the tax tends to produce fraud, since it Is
often paid as an inducement to voting a particular way Since
Congress can prevent fraud, it should have the power to outlaw
what leads to fraud.
12 4
No argument such as this can be advanced i sul)port of Con-
'
22See Breedlove v. Suttles, (1937) 302 U S. 277 58 S. Ct. 205. 82
L. Ed. 252, Pirtle v. Brown, (C.C.A. 6th 1941) 118 F (2d) 218, cert.
denied (1941) 314 U. S. 621. See Notes, Negro Disenfranchsement-A
challenge to the Constitution, (1947) 47 Col. Law Rev 76, 92.123Art. I, sec. 2.
124The constitutionalitv of uch a icasure is said to be "clear," 47
Col. Law Rev. 94.
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gressional power to supervise state educational requirements. On
their face, these are not improper.12 5 They become so only when
used so as to keep out certain groups. The fault is one of administra-
tion. It is common to ask simple questions of those in favor, difficult
ones of Negroes and other "undesirables." Relief from this abuse
can probably be had only in the courts. That may prove difficult
to accomplish, just as it was for a long time difficult to establish
discrimination in the selection of jurors. 20 But a determined cam-
paign, particularly if supported by local citizens of courage and
standing, would be effective. Ultimately that question must come
to the Supreme Court so that it can lay down some rules of
general application.
There is a way, however, in which Congress can reach these
restrictions on the suffrage. Section 2 of the 14th Amendment
provides that the basis of representation of any state shall be re-
duced in the proportion which the number of male citizens over
21 denied the right to vote for reasons except participation in
rebellion or crime bears to the total number of male citizens over
21. It has been enacted as a statute.1 27 Although there is little doubt
that the facts in many states would justify invoking this provi-
sion, 32 political considerations have heretofore prevented its ever
being used.
But it has been suggested 2 9 that the provision refers only to
unconstitutional deprivations of the right to vote and does not,
therefore, apply where the voting lists are reduced by poll tax
or educational requirements. Such interpretation of the amend-
ment disregards its express exception permitting a denial of the
vote for crime. It also ignores the fact that, when the 14th Amend-
ment was adopted, the Constitution contained no restrictions on
the right to vote. These were adopted later, in the 15th and 19th
Amendments. It seems unreasonable, therefore, to accept this
restrictive interpretation of the meaning of the second section of
the 14th Amendment. And it can hardly be doubted that Congress
225See Williams v. Mississippi, (1898) 170 U. S. 213, 18 S. Ct. 583, 42
L. Ed. 1012. Cf. Trudeau v. Barnes, (C.C.A. 5th 1933) 65 F (2d) 563, cert.
denied, 290 U. S. 659.
"26See discussion in 47 Col. Law Rev. 95, 96.
3.217 Stat. 29 (1872), U. S. C. tit 2, sec. 6, 2 U. S. C. A. 6; 2
F C. A. tit. 2, sec. 6.
128 See Fraenkel, Restrictions on Voting in the United States, (1938)
7 N. L. G. Q. 135.
29See McPherson. v. Blacker, (1892) 196 U. S. 1, 39, 25 S. Ct. 158,
49 L. Ed. 363, O'Neal, The Power of Congress to Reduce Representation,
(1905) 181 No. Am. Rev. 530, 538, 542; Maurer, Congressional and State
Control of Elections (1928) 16 Geo. L. J. 314.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
if it would, could discourage state laws restrictive of the suffrage
by holding hearings in a first move to implement the 14th Amend-
ment. The political considerations which have prevented this in
the past may not always remain potent. It is clear, however, that
only Congress can take this action. The courts will not them-
selves enforce this provision of the 14th Amendment. 130
Entirely apart from all changes in the laws themselves is the
question of their administration. This depends both upon a vigorous
attitude in the Department of Justice and a cooperative one in the
communities affected. To some extent the question of crime en-
forcement is involved in the question of jury service. Juries from
which Negroes are systematically excluded tend to be less sym-
pathetic to the enforcement of the civil rights laws than do mixed
juries. The very experience of serving on juries with Negroes
should make the white members of such juries more tolerant. The
question has also been raised whether the local prosecutors are
always adequate, because of their reluctance to antagonize political-
ly powerful interests. We are here dealing with a subtle problem
in community relationships which it will take time and education
to improve.
It has been suggested that it might be easier to obtain convic-
tions if the law were amended so as to avoid the necessity of per-
suading juries that the defendants had wilfully sought to invade
constitutional rights. This could be accomplished in two ways by
simply deleting the word wilful from the statute, by replacing the
present law with a new one making it a crime to violate certain
specific rights. The opinions in the Scre-s case' 3' cast grave
doubt upon the constitutionality of the first proposal. The second
would no doubt remove the argument that the law is too vague to
be enforceable, an argument which led the majority of the Supreme
Court to insist the offense must be a wilful one. Such an amend-
ment would specify precisely those federally secured rights, inter-
ference with which would constitute a crime. The suggestion is per-
suasive, but not, I think sound. For, while specific laws might
produce more convictions for the particular offenses described,
necessarily there would be others left out, either because Congress
had not thought of them at the time or due to the difficulty of ob-
taining Congressional agreement that they should be included.
13OSee Saunders v Wilkins, (C.C.A. 4th 1945) 152 F (2d) 235, cert.
denied (1946) 66 Sup. Ct. 1362.13aScrews v. United States, (1945) 325 U. S. 91, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89
L. Ed. 1495.
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It must be remembered also that the conventional methods of
law enforcement ,by criminal or civil action have proved ineffec-
tive in this field, even in relatively enlightened states, such as New
York. When the New York Legislature planned a large scale
attack on discrimination in employment, it used administrative
procedure found valuable in dealing with labor relations under
the Wagner Act. Perhaps, therefore, better results can be obtained
through extending the area of administrative activity than by
changing existing criminal law
Improvement in this field must, therefore, result from general
communty action, implemented by Congress and supported by the
Supreme Court. There is no present excuse for Congress to refuse
to exercise its constitutional powers to the full. There is every
reasonable hope that the Supreme Court, repudiating some ancient
doctrines, will considerably extend Congressional power. All de-
cent elements in every community should, therefore, cooperate in
accomplishing these results and in seeing to it that the laws are
vigorously enforced. Only in that way can the blots of lynching
and other demals of civil rights be obliterated.
